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In his paper ‘‘What’s Wrong with Argumentum Ad Baculum?’’ Robert
Kimball puts forward a criterion for analyzing arguments from threat
that is supposed to be an alternative to the dialogue-based models of
rational argumentation that are currently the dominant models for
analysis and evaluation of ad baculum (Kimball, 2006, p. 89). He
thinks that the shift in analysis from the syntactical argument form
technique applied in isolation from use, to the newer pragmatic ap-
proach of analyzing ad baculum arguments in a context of dialogue,
has been a good thing. However, he argues that the dialogue-based
analysis, although it explains well why mild or benign threats can be
legitimately used in some situations, like negotiation, does not satisfac-
torily account for what is objectionable about more malicious uses of
threats. As an alternative, Kimball proposes an analysis of threats
based on a Kantian ethic of respect for persons. From his analysis of
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social relationships of parenting, partnering, and other similar cases,
Kimball proposes criteria for distinguishing between objectionable and
permissible threats, which he frames in terms of ethical character
traits, virtues, and vices. His explanation of argument from threat
stems from the concepts of character, intentions, and purposes of
persons who make threats.
We think that such singular ethical judgements about specific
persons and their intentions are beyond the reach of the technology of
argumentation designed to identify analyze and evaluate arguments.
However, we do agree that inferences drawn from reasoned assump-
tions about an arguer’s character can sometimes be relevant for the
analysis of argumentation. The purpose of this reply is to show that
the dialogue-based analysis can do a lot more than Kimball thinks to
analyze the kinds of malicious threats he considers. Kimball, in our
perspective, instead of presenting an alternative to dialogue theory, of-
fers an approach that needs to be more firmly based on it. We offer
suggestions for developing these parts of it, especially the dialectical
analysis of abductive reasoning, in a more comprehensive direction.
We review the fundamental characteristics of the dialogue-based
approach to argumentum ad baculum, and show how a dialectical
perspective can offer more assistance than Kimball thinks for analyz-
ing threat arguments and ad baculum fallacies.
1. KIMBALL’S THEORY ON THREAT ARGUMENTS
Kimball centres his analysis of ad baculum argument on the distinction
between malicious and benign threats. As he recognizes (p. 93), the
dialogue-based theories of Walton and Krabbe (1995) and van Eemer-
en and Grootendorst (2004) successfully explain why and how benign
threats are acceptable in some contexts of dialogue. The study of lin-
guistic exchanges in dialogue patterns characterized by a set of dialec-
tical rules allows one to identify dialogical violations and illicit shifts
from one type of dialogue into another. This framework, when applied
to the analysis of specific cases where the ad baculum fallacy is sus-
pected, can be successfully used to identify a threat used inappropri-
ately in a particular context of dialogue. For instance, while the use of
a threat is generally inappropriate in a critical discussion, the same
argument could be acceptable in a quarrel or a negotiation.
However, as Kimball highlights (p. 94), there is another important
difference in addition to the distinction between appropriate and inad-
missible threats. Some ad baculum arguments, even though used in
negotiations, quarrels, or information-seeking dialogues like prisoner
interrogations, should be judged malicious, independently of the dia-
logical context in which they are employed. For example, use of tor-
ture or threats of death or violence should always be considered
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unacceptable and malicious, in virtue not of dialogue-relative rules of
rational argumentation, but of some even more general universal cate-
gorical discourse norms (p. 94). The weakness Kimball identifies in
dialogue-based theories is basically the absence of such general rules
transcending the essential conditions of a type of dialogue. These latter
conditions might simply state what has to be brought about in order
to take part of a certain dialogue game, but they do not prescribe
which moves absolutely should not be carried out in any type of
verbal exchange. The solution Kimball envisages, grounded upon the
concept of virtue and character, is advanced as an alternative to the
dialogue-based theories.
Instead of inquiring into dialogical conditions of acceptability and
fallaciousness using dialectical criteria based on dialogue rules and dia-
lectical shifts, Kimball examines the consequences of a threat on the
interlocutor’s relationship with the speaker, and the character of the
speaker. If the speaker’s character is characterized by good will, empa-
thy, patience, or other virtues stemming from a good character, the
threat is likely to be benign (p. 96). On the contrary, in Kimball’s
view, a threatener’s narcissism and arrogance are usually the causes of
a malign threat, and malicious people are less likely to be able to rec-
ognize manipulative from persuasive uses of threat (p. 96). The argu-
ment analyst, using such evidence, is able to distinguish when the
argument is malicious and when it is benign. If the fallaciousness of an
appeal to threat can be assessed by using character criteria, the char-
acter of a person is strongly influenced by the arguments he uses. The
repetitive use of threat shows a character that tries only to bend the
interlocutor to his own will, by means of coercion and intimidation
instead of cooperation (p. 97). The evaluation of a person’s character,
in other words, is strongly influenced by the type of interpersonal rela-
tionship he establishes by means of his arguments.
The crucial criterion of the abusive ad baculum argument, in Kim-
ball’s view, is the prior negative evaluation of the speaker’s character.
Not only does the use of a threat depend on the intentions, will and
empathy of the speaker, but also the character of the speaker is often
judged on the basis of arguments put forward. In his theory, the argu-
ment ad baculum can be, in fact, a useful indicator of speaker’s habi-
tus, or habitual element in his character. A person using repeated
speech acts of making threats shows lack of respect for his interlocu-
tors; he prefers imposing his own will than persuading the hearer with
rational arguments. Regularity in using such ad baculum arguments
plays a role in not only revealing but also in producing negative traits
in speaker’s character. The bully shows bad character by a pattern of
repeated use of threats when confronted with any problem or need to
engage in argumentation.
THE FALLACIOUSNESS OF THREATS 65
The strict interrelation between threat and character is the founda-
tion of the four conditions for the use of threat to be even possibly
legitimate (p. 97). These conditions are aimed at distinguishing
between threats that are always malicious, and threats that might be
permissible in some contexts of dialogue.
(1) the speaker has good reasons for believing that a threat would be an
effective means of persuasion,
(2) she uses the minimal threat necessary for persuasion,
(3) she herself has good reasons for what she is trying to persuade her
audience of, and
(4) she had good reasons for believing that her audience would not be
persuaded by reasons.
These four rules, we notice, are grounded upon two crucial points: (1)
acceptable threats must be arguments, and (2) acceptable threats must
be means of persuasion. Regarding the first point, we observe that in
Kimball’s account there is not a clear distinction between an argument
from threat, a fallacious threat and a simple threat. There is a sub-
stantial difference between the use of a speech act of threat to achieve a
dialogical (interactive) goal, and the employment of such an act only to
scare the interlocutor. Also, if we take other possible dialogue types into
consideration, we should notice that threats are frequently used in nego-
tiation dialogue, and some are acceptable dialogical moves.
The second observation we want to make is closely related to the
first, and regards the relation between threat and persuasion. Kimball
highlights the ethical superiority of reasonably persuading the hearer
over forcing him to acceptance by means of threat. We should notice
that his concept of legitimate use of threat is based on the persuasive
power of ad baculum argument, and on the conflict between persua-
sion by threat and persuasion by reasons. The crucial problem that
has to be addressed is whether a threat could be a means of persua-
sion or whether it is a simple strategy of interest-based collective deci-
sion-making. To better explain our question, we can use Kimball’s
example. Let us consider the example of a child whose parents use the
argument ‘‘If you don’t eat your vegetables, you can’t have dessert’’ to
make him eat the veggies he has refused to eat. Our question is: is the
child really persuaded of the importance of eating the vegetables, or
does he simply recognizes that eating the vegetables would prevent
him from facing what he regards as a bad consequence? Are these two
reactions identical, closely related, or do they merely belong to two
different dialectical fields? Can a threat be persuasive? Are all means
used to induce the interlocutor to do something arguments, that is,
reasons advanced to support a standpoint? Or is simply the goal of the
use of reason different in distinct dialogical situations? If we analyze
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Kimball’s conditions from this point of view, it seems that the bound-
aries he identifies are too strict. For instance, for Kimball in order for
a threat to be acceptable, the speaker must have good reasons sup-
porting position. However, we can think about cases of bargaining, in
which there is a simple conflict of interests and the whole interaction is
a simple sequence of offer-counteroffer moves. Would a persuasive
argumentation be reasonable in this case? In other words, are all types
of dialogue persuasive?
To summarize, we have highlighted two crucial theses in Kimball’s
theory: the necessity of overarching meta-dialectical rules, perhaps ethi-
cal rules for communication, and the dialogical importance of charac-
ter. Kimball’s proposal explains the reason why making a threat is an
indicator of bad character, and should only be used as a last resort for
making the other party bring about a certain course of action. His the-
ory, grounded upon the notion of intention and purpose, identifies
some overarching rules of an ethical nature that are advanced as
alternative to the more usual dialectical types of analysis of fallacious
argument. The implication is that dialogue-based models of rational
argumentation are too weak to judge whether a threat is benign or
vicious, and use such judgements to evaluate ad baculum arguments as
fallacious or not. We will reply, however, that this opposition Kimball
sets up between the two approaches to the ad baculum fallacy is not
necessary. We will argue that character should be an important part of
dialectical theories and that the kind of judgements Kimball wants to
make can already be used as part of the evidence for evaluating ad bac-
ulum arguments in existing dialogue models of rational argumentation.
A virtue-based theory should be, in our perspective, integrated into
a dialogue-based account, but the problem is that a virtue-based the-
ory risks not being successfully applicable to a dialogue analysis. The
reason for this claim lies in the notions of persuasion and negotiation.
The fundamental problem Kimball highlights is a lack of foundation
of dialogue rules, and the solution he envisages is to substitute the dia-
logical model with an argumentative framework based upon ethics.
His observation is extremely challenging, thorough, and revolutionary.
However, it seems to suggest new possibilities of development to dia-
logue-based theories, more than proving their inadequacy.
2. THREAT AND DIALOGUES
The crucial point we now turn to considering is the distinction be-
tween persuading and forcing. Kimball rightly considers persuasion to
be connected to the notion of offering a reason to support a claim
that is in doubt, and contrasts it with the notion of making a threat,
which he sees as grounded on the notion of causation. A person is
persuaded when a reason is advanced to attempt to overcome his
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doubt, while he is threatened when a particular way of attempting to
cause a belief or action in/by him is brought about. So conceived, the
notion of attempting persuasion by means of reasons seems to be
completely incompatible with the notion of making a threat. A threat,
according to Kimball’s theory, cannot be (rationally) persuasive. The
critical problem is to define what persuasion is, and evaluate whether
influencing the other person’s behaviour by means of threat can be
considered an act of persuasion.
Aristotle, in the Rhetoric individuates the three fundamental compo-
nents of the ‘‘artistic’’ process of persuasion (McBurney, 1936, p. 60)
in the speaker’s ethos, hearer’s pathos, and in the reasons (logos) gi-
ven. If we analyze the meaning of ‘‘persuasion’’, we can notice that it
derives from the notion of pirsiV, which can be translated with ‘‘trust’’
(Rigotti, 1995, p. 8, 1997, p. 3). The process of persuasion can be suc-
cessful when there is a relation of trust between hearer and speaker,
and the arguments are reasonable. The hearer adheres to the point of
view of the speaker in virtue of the reasons advanced to support it, of
the credibility of the speaker, and of the benevolent attitude to believe
the speaker and change his own position the hearer already has.
Rational persuasion of this kind can be attempted not only in a criti-
cal discussion but also in deliberation, where the problem is to decide
between courses of action. In Perelman’s view, the fundamental
relation between the interlocutors’ esprits is at the basis of the speak-
er’s influence on the hearer’s intensity of adhesion to a certain thesis
(Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1970, p. 18).
If we analyze the process of persuasion applied to deliberation, we
can bring in the belief-desire intention (BDI) model of practical rea-
soning. Following Clarke’s BDI model (1985), we can analyze rational
arguments leading to a conclusion to bring about an action as groun-
ded on the concepts of desire and interest. In book III of the Topics
(III, 1), Aristotle bases his theory of rational choice on the notion of
what is preferable and desirable. We can represent the process of
deliberation as follows (see also Rigotti and Rocci, 2001). In Figure 1,
the hearer is represented in a grey box, indicating its role as a compo-
nent of the communicative process, together with the communicative
situation.
In the situation box are actions the agent knows are means that can
be used to carry out the action, as well as knowledge about at least
some of the likely consequences. This BDI model of practical reason-
ing can be applied to a case of everyday reasoning. We can analyze
the following example:
Bob: I do not want to eat the vegetables. I do not like them
Parents: If you don’t eat your vegetables, you can’t have dessert
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In the diagram in Figure 2 below, Bob’s process of deliberation is
represented:
In this simple model, part of the example is presented showing
Bob’s desires with respect to vegetables, and the situation in which he
can make a choice about eating them.
Figure 2. Process of reasoning in the vegetables example.
Figure 1. BDI model of the process of reasoning in deliberation.
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In a persuasion dialogue, the crucial concept is the other person’s
viewpoint (see also Rigotti and Cigada, 2004). The hearer, in other
words, changes his position and reasonably adheres to the speaker’s
viewpoint; when the two viewpoints are contradictory or incompatible,
the adoption of the speaker’s position means for the hearer giving up
his own point of view. In the language of (Walton and Krabbe, 1995),
the hearer in this case changes his commitments by retracting a
previous proposition he adhered to, and instead becomes committed to
a different one. The speaker needs to make presumptions about the
situation and hearer’s desires and intentions, based on the evidence of
what is said and done to that point, and advance a reason in support
of a position contrary to the hearer’s based on what he takes to be the
hearer’s interests (or presumed desires). In other words, the speaker, in
order to achieve rational persuasion, should argue adopting the hear-
er’s perspective and use an argument presenting a stronger reason for
him to come to believe the new position, even if it is contrary to the
old one. For instance, knowing that Bob cares about his health, the
speaker could tell him that vegetables are good for one’s health and
therefore, since he wants to be healthy, he should eat them. The per-
suasion dialogue, in such a case, should be grounded on the hearer’s
perspective, and its purpose is to lead the hearer to willingly agree to
the new, contrary position.
For instance, consider the following simple case of a persuasion
dialogue.
Bob: I do not want to eat the vegetables. I do not like them
Karl: Yes, but you want to be healthy and the vegetables are good for your health.
The structure of the argumentation in this case can be represented in
the following argument diagram. In the diagram, the double line con-
necting Bob’s premises with Karl’s indicate that Bob premises are part
of Karl’s argument. Karl, in order to argue for the greater desirability
of the vegetables, presupposes the knowledge of Bob’s desires and
intentions and of his possibilities of choice.
As the diagram in Figure 3 shows, Karl’s argument, in the two
boxes on the right, functions as a refutation of Bob’s viewpoint that
eating vegetables is not good, as a general policy that he adheres to.
Karl’s argument leads to the opposite conclusion.
Now let’s turn from persuasion dialogue and deliberation to a dif-
ferent type of dialogue. In a negotiation, trying to change the hear-
er’s beliefs and viewpoint by the kind of argumentation described
above may not be very effective or useful, and may not even be
relevant to the purpose of the dialogue. In negotiation dialogue both
interlocutors want to advance their interests (Walton, 2000, p. 181).
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In this kind of dialogue, the goal is not to totally defeat the interloc-
utor by any means, or to persuade him that some proposition is
true or false, but to make a deal that is acceptable to both parties.
The speaker does not primary try to persuade the other party (even
though he can, and often this is the case, shift to a persuasion
dialogue), but to alter the situation in order to modify the link be-
tween evaluation and action.
For instance, in the ‘‘vegetables or no dessert’’ example, the speaker
is not trying to understand the hearer’s desires and use her grasp of
that to get him to eat his vegetables. The hearer, even after the rea-
sons were given, still believes that eating the vegetables is not what he
wants to do. However, he eats the vegetables because this course of
action has become, after the threat, more expedient. We can represent
such a negotiation dialogue as follows:
Bob: I do not want to eat the vegetables. I do not like them.
Karl: If you don’t eat your vegetables, you can’t have dessert.
The argumentation in this small dialogue can be represented in the fol-
lowing argument diagram. While the role of the line connecting Bob’s
second premise with Karl’s argument is the same as specified in
the diagram above, the arrow directed towards Bob’s first premise
Figure 3. Presupposed knowledge of an agent’s desires and intentions.
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represents a modification. In other words, Karl’s argument changes
Bob’s decisional situation, as shown in Figure 4.
In this example, we need to notice that Bob’s evaluation remains
unaltered, but his decision changes because of the situation being modi-
fied (according to Kimball’s conception of threat, p. 91). Karl uses
Bob’s desires and intentions, but manipulates the initial situation,
thereby changing Bob’s decision. We can observe that in the persuasion
dialogue Bob changes his point of view, that is, his evaluation of whe-
ther vegetables are good and the action of eating them. However, in the
negotiation dialogue, Bob accepts a certain course of action because it
is more expedient, not because it is better.
In our view, use of a threat cannot be considered to be in itself an
attempt to persuade, but is sometimes a successful strategy for influ-
encing the interlocutor’s decision. Our point of view stems from a con-
cept of persuasion as a changing of reasonable commitment to a
standpoint obtained by means of argumentative discourse. The process
of choice shown above is grounded upon the deliberative decision for
the hearer, that is, reasons showing which choice is better for him.
Obviously it is possible to influence the hearer’s attitude towards a
proposition, or his decisions, in many ways. If we consider totalitarian
Figure 4. An argument changing the decisional situation.
72 DOUGLAS WALTON and FABRIZIO MACAGNO
regimes, we notice that threats of punishment for opponents can
strongly influence people’s attitude towards the government itself. We
recognize that threats can influence a person’s behaviour, or their
commitment to a thesis. However, it is debatable whether in this case
it is the attitude that changes, or the course of action adopted. Obvi-
ously the people in a regime choose what is better for them, that is,
the government. But the agreement with the government’s ideas is not
opposed to disagreement, but to death or torture. Similarly, in Or-
well’s 1984, Winston changes his opinion about Big Brother after tor-
tures and appeals to fear. However, can we say that Winston, after
giving up his last resistance to the de-humanizing efforts of the Minis-
try of Love, is still the same Winston? In other terms, has Winston’s
evaluation of the world changed, or is Winston’s perception of the
world that has been distorted? Or have Winston’s actions merely set
him on a difference course?
The distinction we want to trace is between persuasion and influenc-
ing behaviour. This distinction is crucial to separate between manipu-
lation and persuasion, and between persuasion and other types of
dialogue. In this perspective, a dialogical approach to threat is funda-
mental for the assessment of this dialogical strategy.
3. DIALECTICAL SHIFTS, TYPES OF NEGOTIATION
AND TYPES OF THREAT
In this section, we follow the direction of Kimball’s theory by going
beyond the dialectical level to an even broader level of argumentation
analysis that takes the social and cultural setting of the use of an argu-
ment into account. Shared communicative values, for example, values
that would be contravened by speech acts of making a threat, need to
be taken into account at this level.
The crucial contention of the dialectical analysis of ad baculum
argumentation in (Walton, 2000) was the proposed criterion to be
used for distinguishing between legitimate and fallacious arguments
from threat. The ad baculum fallacy arises, on this analysis, when a
threat argument, which could be legitimate in a negotiation, is
advanced in a persuasion dialogue. For instance, let’s consider once
again the situation where Karl is trying to explain to Bob, his son,
that eating his vegetables is good for him. He advances several argu-
ments, and eventually he claims, ‘‘If you don’t say that eating your
vegetables is good for you, you can’t have dessert’’. In this case, we
should not judge Karl’s argument as appropriate and reasonable as a
persuasive move. He is threatening his son in order to achieve his
goal. This type of speech act is clearly contrary to the rules for the
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type of persuasion dialogue called the critical discussion (van Eemeren
and Grootendorst, 2004).
But we can also imagine another situation in which Karl is trying to
make Bob eat his vegetables. After having tried to persuade him, and
giving up, in exasperation he says, ‘‘If you don’t eat your vegetables,
you can’t have dessert’’. We can also imagine a third situation: in
order to make Bob study his piano lesson, his teacher, Karl says, ‘‘If
you don’t study the lesson, I will beat you with the strap’’. In the
first case, Bob is shifting from a persuasion dialogue, having as a
goal leading the interlocutor to reasonably adhere to a position, to a
negotiation type of dialogue. The goal of the dialogue, namely per-
suading the other party, is not achieved by means of this shift. Still,
Bob has been presented with a prudential reason for carrying out the
action advocated by Karl. In this case, the threat could be judged
fallacious, on the ground that it is dialectically irrelevant. In the sec-
ond case, Karl’s purpose is to make Bob eat the vegetables. He can
achieve this goal by means of a persuasion dialogue, but he can also
negotiate. If the dialogue is seen as negotiation, the threat could pos-
sibly be justified as legitimate (within that argument framework). In
the third case, dialectically speaking, the shift brought about by
Karl’s moving to the threat argument is no different from case two.
Even so, as Kimball would urge, we cannot claim that this argument
is acceptable. What possible basis for such an evaluation could be
invoked?
To answer this question, we must move out of the dialectical frame-
work to another level. At this level, a normative model of dialogue for
rational argumentation, like a critical discussion, a deliberation or a
negotiation, needs to be seen as embedded in a cultural or institutional
framework of rules, values and accepted practices. This approach to
the different levels of conversational activities and rules can be related
to Van Eemeren and Houtlosser’s notion of a speech event (Van Eem-
eren and Houtlosser, 2005). A speech event is a particular cultural or
institutional framework in which a given argument was put forward.
For example, in a parliamentary debate or a trial, to judge an argu-
ment as relevant or not, one must know something about the purpose
of the discourse, the parties that are discussing it, and the procedural
rules that govern it. Where there is an irrelevant move or argument,
the rule that has been contravened is not (at least exclusively) on the
dialectical level, but on a broader communicative level.1 One has to
make assumptions about the communicative activity the argument is
supposed to be part of. Let’s consider a case in point, concerning the
communicative activity of teaching.
The goal of a teacher is to teach the pupil, not only to make
him study, but to arouse an interest in the matter and to teach him
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discipline and behaviour rules. He can achieve these results by inform-
ing the student, by explaining things to him, by setting down rules,
and in many instances also by persuading him to accept propositions
as true, or, when he is not successful in obtaining any result, by nego-
tiation. The relationship between teacher and pupil can be ideally rep-
resented as follows (see also Rigotti and Cigada, 2004).
Teacher: 
- Have wider knowledge   
- Set down behavior rules for the pupils 
- Enforce the rules 
- Be just and fair 
Pupil: 
- Respect the teacher
- Trust in the teacher 
- Obey the teacher 
- … 
The relation between the interlocutors, in western culture, and nowa-
days by conventional standards, can be considered to be based on the
concepts of respect and trust (Govier, 1998). Threats, for this reason,
can alter the situation in the classroom, but should not shift the rela-
tionship between the interlocutors from respect to fear. The threat
used, in other words, should be prudential, but without breaking the
teacher–pupil relationship that needs to be taken for granted as part
of the speech event for this type of communicative activity. The threat
escalation should be within the limits imposed by the communicative
framework. If a teacher can threaten the pupils with black marks and
disciplinary sanctions, he cannot spank them. In other cultures, or in a
different speech event, where the relationship between teacher and pu-
pil may not be conventionally based on values of mutual respect and
concern, a more severe type of threat might be legitimate. We can
think about examples of threat appeals commonly used by European
teachers at the beginning of the last century.
In cases of parental and partnering relations, we can postulate the
same kind of setting with its set of accepted procedures, values, and
goals. The same point applies. The use of threat, when admissible,
should not alter the nature of the relationship between the parties. The
conversational admissibility of a move depends on the relationship be-
tween the interlocutors and on how the relationship is culturally con-
ceived. The use of severe or even violent threats is relevant according
to the situation in which they are employed. For instance, in diplo-
matic negotiations, an appeal to violent threat is sometimes a relevant
and powerful prudential argument. For instance, in cases of diplo-
matic tension between nations, the following argument could be rele-
vant and acceptable:
The U.S. should not attack our ally. The U.S. exports many goods to our country
and our decision to block the import of American goods to our state could be detri-
mental to U.S. economy.
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Various kinds of appeals to the threatened use of violence, for exam-
ple in the form of threats to deploy powerful weapons, are extremely
common in cases where normal cooperative diplomatic negotiations
fail to resolve a deadlocked conflict of interests.
One link between interlocutors’ relations and types of relevant
moves has been integrated into argumentation theory by proposals for
distinguishing between different kinds of negotiation. In (Walton and
McKersie, 1965)2 four kinds of negotiation are analyzed: distributive
(conflicting), integrative (partially cooperative), attitudinal structuring
(involving not only economical interests but also personal relation-
ships), and inter-organizational bargaining (whose purpose is to reach
an agreement and alignment between organizations). Threats are often
used in all four kinds of negotiations, but the severity of a threat that
is considered relevant can vary, depending on which kind of negotia-
tion is supposed to be the framework for the negotiations.
Procedural principles of admissibility can also be set or imposed by
national or international law. For instance, in the following example,
the use of threat should not be judged as legally appropriate or even
permissible, even though the nature of the relationship is one of con-
flict (Morris, 1980, p. 160):
Former Governor George C. Wallace, during his 1968 campaign: If any demonstra-
tor ever lays down in front of my car, it’ll be the last car he’ll ever lay down in
front of.
Similarly, the use of torture and physical violence in the examination of
prisoners is a kind of negotiation escalation that has been banned by
human rights conventions. However, these appeals to threat were per-
missible and common in the legal system of some centuries ago.
Obviously, together with the goals of the dialogical activity we
should consider other factors such as the expectations about an inter-
personal relationship. The more social aspect we analyzed is only a
broader and simplified perspective. Human relationships can be dam-
aged by threats, and the goal of avoiding conflicts can be considered
the foundation of many politeness and behaviour rules. These rules
can be social, as seen above, or interpersonal. Thereby, a threat can be
dialogically sound, but inappropriate to the activity, inappropriate to
the social context, or unsound from an inter-relational point of view.
Logical or dialectical normative models of argumentation cannot de-
cide, by themselves, in such cases, whether a threat should be judged
to be an unacceptable ad baculum or not. Moving to a wider commu-
nicative framework by specifying goals and rules of a speech event is a
necessary step to make such an evaluation.
Bringing in a communicative framework can supplement the dialec-
tical approach to make a fuller judgement of certain kinds of cases to
help provide a useful instrument to analyze the argumentation moves
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from a critical perspective grounded upon notions of institutional rules
and interpersonal relations. In this account, we can notice, some of
Kimball’s four conditions can be easily integrated. For instance, a dia-
lectical shift can be reasonable when a persuasion dialogue comes to
an impasse and the use of threat must be minimal, that is, the threat
must respect the boundaries of the interpersonal relationship.
4. ABDUCTIVE REASONING ABOUT CHARACTER
The last observation we want to advance concerns the logical form
of reasoning about the notion of character. Kimball emphasized the
factor of good or bad character in judging the uses of ad baculum
arguments. We would like to extend the analysis to another kind of
argument, the ad hominem, in order to show how the notion of char-
acter needs to be analyzed from a dialectical perspective, and inquire
into the reasons for the strict interdependence between ethical judge-
ments and reasoning. The argumentative principle that can be specified
as lying at the basis of character evaluation is that of abductive rea-
soning from an agent’s words and deeds to a hypothesis about the
agent’s character. In this form of reasoning a critic starts with a set of
facts, and considers several competing accounts, each of which is a set
of connected propositions that could explain these facts. One property
of an account is that it is supposed to be consistent, and if it is found
to be inconsistent, the inconsistency needs to be resolved. Based on
such a notion of account, an argumentation scheme for abductive rea-
soning can be represented as follows (Walton, 2002, p. 44):
PREMISE 1 D is a set of data or supposed facts in a case.
PREMISE 2 Each one of a set of accounts A1, A2,..., An is successful in
explaining D.
PREMISE 3 Ai is the account that explains D most successfully.
CONCLUSION Therefore Ai is the most plausible hypothesis in the case.
This scheme can be applied to character judgements as follows. The
evaluator E perceives a situation in which an agent A carries out an
action C, for instance: A, risking his own life, enters a building in
flames and saves a baby from certain death. E, in addition to the
data he perceives, possesses a commonly shared knowledge base
called a script (Walton, 2006, p. 128). For instance, E knows, and
knows that A thinks or knows, that the consequence of leaving the
baby in the building is his death, and that the only means of avoid-
ing this outcome is to enter the building and bring him out. E, in
other words, assumes that the goal of A is to save the baby, since
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this explanation is the best available at the moment. The fact that A
is risking his life to save the baby’s life can best be explained by A’s
altruism and strong commitment to important values. This explana-
tion is an account that contains characteristics fitting the definition
of ‘‘courage’’ (p. 133):
an agent is courageous if that agent persists in carrying out, or trying to carry out a
worthy goal in the face of obstacles that pose danger for her, or at any rate repre-
sent something that would be highly painful or difficult, like likelihood of personal
injury or even death. It might be added that courageous action typically involves
altruism, so that the worthy goal is not just selfish, and involves giving up selfish
interests to help others.
The reasoning that follows can be analyzed according to the follow-
ing abductive pattern for the argumentation scheme for argument
from classification.
Agent a did something that can be classified as fitting a particular character quality.
Therefore a has this character quality.
For instance, A did a courageous action therefore A is courageous.
Abductive reasoning can work in the other direction as well (p. 195):
Agent a has a character quality of a kind that has been defined.
Therefore if a carries out some action in the future, this action is likely to be classi-
fiable as fitting under that character quality.
For instance, since A is courageous, A is likely not to have other inter-
ests to save the baby and therefore this action was courageous.
This analysis can be applied to the ethical reasoning Kimball at-
tempts to employ in his analysis of ad baculum arguments. The falla-
cious use of such an argument, he hypothesizes, can be based on some
ground if we can classify the arguer’s character as arrogant, and if
arrogance can be seen as the reason for the behaviour. Vice versa, the
inferred character of a person who carried out an action or made a
threat can offer some weak reason to classify an argument as falla-
cious in cases of uncertainty. Consider the example of an arrogant and
violent child advancing a threat to a friend: ‘‘If you do not lend me
your bike I will beat you up’’. In this case, the use of the threat is so-
cially unacceptable and breaks the boundaries of the relation of friend-
ship. From the data in the case, the framework of the dialogue and
the social context, we can draw conclusions about the inappropriate-
ness of the threat. For example, we can say that if this dialogue is
supposed to be a persuasion dialogue, a negotiation, or a deliberation
type of dialogue, the threat used was inappropriate for argumentation
78 DOUGLAS WALTON and FABRIZIO MACAGNO
in that type of dialogue. If no information is given about the type of
dialogue or the speech event, all we can do is to note the lack of
evidence, and venture a hypothetical evaluation of the ad baculum
argument, based on assumptions about the context of dialogue and
speech event.
We observe that in many cases, even though character reasoning
might be a useful instrument to evaluate ambiguous cases or the
speaker’s personality, it cannot be a basis to evaluate the acceptabil-
ity of an argument. However, given the strict relation between
argumentation and character, evidence showing bad character (for
example dishonesty or hypocrisy) might provide a defeasible reason
for having reservations about accepting an argument. From this per-
spective, Kimball’s proposal of analyzing the relation between charac-
ter and argument highlights the dialogical importance of taking into
account the social relationship between the interlocutors as a principle
for pragmatic interpretation and disambiguation of a text of discourse.
5. CONCLUSIONS
Kimball’s analysis of ad baculum arguments has raised questions that
stretch dialectical argumentation methods to their limits. How do you
determine whether someone has a bad or good intention when they
make a threat? The basic problem with Kimball’s attempt to answer
this question is that it takes us into the zone of virtue ethics, where we
have to judge other people’s motives, intentions, and values. This is
not a place where we want to be, as argumentation analysts, for it
would surrender argumentation theory into making judgements about
values and virtues of individual persons that may not be based on
clear and objective criteria and evidence that can be verified and
reproduced. Using argumentation technology to identify, analyze, and
evaluate the given argument would take us into the territory of mak-
ing judgements about ethical values and criminal actions of the indi-
vidual persons. We’re now in the terrain of ethics and law. However,
the fact is, to analyze argument and informal fallacies like ad hominem
and ad baculum, we are taken, to some degree anyhow, into the realm
of values, character, intentions, and so forth, subjective notions. The
best we can do is to take the given text of discourse and use that to
judge whether a character allegation made by one party in a dispute is
justified by the textual and contextual evidence in the case. But this is
where we need dialectic, because we need to look at each case individ-
ually, and use the evidence given in that case to judge whether an
inference that might be based on character, values, motives or inten-
tions, is reasonable or not, based on the evidence. We have argued
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that abductive reasoning is the dialectical tool needed to draw infer-
ences from the known facts of a case, based on an account of an ar-
guer’s words and deeds, to a conclusion about the arguer’s imputed
goals and motives.
Some discussion of how motive evidence works in law can help to
illustrate the point. In general, we never really know what another per-
son’s true motive is, because of the problem of other minds. However,
using practical reasoning, we can draw inferences about what some-
body’s motive presumably was in a given case, based on the evidence
concerning their words and actions as known in that case. But motive
evidence is tricky. In some cases in law attempting to bring in charac-
ter is inadmissible, on the grounds that it might tend to prejudice a
jury. In other cases, however, motive evidence can be admissible. For
example in a murder case, motive could be relevant if a suspect stood
to gain a large inheritance. The reason is that the prospect of gaining
a large amount of money would be a motive for the crime.
What has been shown is that we need dialectic to help us judge
whether inferences drawn on the basis of presumed motive, character,
or other internal factors that might relate to values and virtue ethics,
are reasonable or not. To some extent, as we’ve tried to show, to
make such judgements it is necessary to go somewhat beyond formal
dialectic to consider the communicative context of an argument by
taking institutional or cultural factors, including values, into account.
But going to this level, by itself, is useless, unless it is based on an
underlying dialectical structure, with argumentation schemes and clear
and precise distinctions drawn between different types of dialogue in
which arguments are used.
NOTES
1 The idea of the dependence of ‘‘conversational activities’’ on the interlocutors’ position has
been suggested by Andrea Rocci (personal communication).
2 Quoted in Walton (2000, p. 186).
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